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In 2003, part-time employment in Australia accounted for over 42% of the Australian 
female workforce, nearly 17% of the male workforce, and represented 28% of total 
employment.  Of the OECD countries, only the Netherlands has a higher proportion of 
working women employed part-time and Australia tops the OECD league in terms of its 
proportion of working men who are part-time. In this paper we investigate part-time full-
time hourly wage gaps using important new panel data from the first four waves of the 
new Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. We find that, once 
unobserved individual heterogeneity has been taken into account, part-time men and 
women typically earn an hourly pay premium. This premium varies with casual 
employment status, but is always positive, a result that survives our robustness checks. 
We advance some hypotheses as to why there is a part-time pay advantage in Australia. 
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  1. INTRODUCTION   
In 2003, part-time employment in Australia accounted for over 42% of the Australian 
female workforce, nearly 17% of the male workforce, and represented 28% of total 
employment (OECD, 2004).  Of the OECD countries, only the Netherlands has a higher 
proportion of working women employed part-time and Australia tops the OECD league 
in terms of its proportion of working men who are part-time.1  Against this background, 
our aim is to investigate whether there is, in Australia, a pay premium or penalty 
associated with part-time work relative to full-time work. We also explore the degree to 
which observed pay gaps differ by gender. 
 Part-time jobs are often viewed as bad jobs with low pay and little career 
prospects (Blank, 1990). Studies based on representative survey data typically find a 
part-time pay penalty (for a review of US studies see Hirsch (2004), and for the UK see 
inter alia Simpson (1986), Main (1988), Blank (1990), and Ermisch and Wright (1992)). 
However, more recent analysis by Hirsch (2005), using US panel data, finds little 
evidence of a pay gap between part-time and full-time women, although he does find a 
part-time pay penalty for men. Rodgers (2004) analyses cross-sectional data from Wave 
1 of the new Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, 
carried out in 2001. Although her raw data indicate a part-time pay penalty for female 
and male employees, this vanishes once observables and unobservables have been taken 
into account. Using a selection model to control for unobservables, she finds a part-time 
                                                          
1 According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2004:310), the OECD average for 2003 was 25% for 
women and 7% for men.   
wage premium of 9% for women and 3% for men, although neither is statistically 
significant at the 5% confidence level.2
 In this paper we extend Rodgers’ (2004) cross-sectional analysis by exploiting 
panel data from the first four waves of the HILDA Survey, which span the years 2001-
2004. These data afford an opportunity to control for unobservables using panel data 
techniques. To our knowledge, ours is the first study using representative Australian 
panel data to estimate part-time/full-time wage differentials, probably because a suitable 
panel dataset has only very recently become available with the HILDA Survey. 
Important advantages of these data are that they provide a very rich set of controls and 
that they allow for estimation controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Our empirical analysis closely follows that of Hirsch (2005) using US data, 
although we deviate from his approach in allowing for a unique aspect of the Australian 
industrial relations system, the practice of “casual” employment. Casual workers in 
Australia are defined as those who are ineligible for sick and holiday pay entitlement and 
who are often paid a wage premium as a compensating differential (see Wooden and 
Warren, 2003, and references therein).  Some 41% of part-time women in our sample 
and 60% of part-time men are classified as casual, and it is therefore important to 
distinguish carefully between casual and non-casual status in estimating pay differentials. 
Our empirical analysis reveals that, once unobserved individual heterogeneity has 
been taken into account, part-time men and women in Australia typically earn an hourly 
pay premium. This premium varies with casual employment status. Thus part-time 
women who are on casual contracts earn more than part-time non-casual women, who in 
turn earn more than the full-time women ceteris paribus. However part-time men who 
are casuals earn less than part-time non-casual men, although they still earn more than 
                                                          
2 Rodgers (2004) estimates a multinomial logit model of selection into part-time work and full-time work. 
The coefficient to lambda  - the selectivity term – is positive and statistically significant in her full-time 
worker wage equations but is not statistically significant in her part-time wage equations. 
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full-time men, all else equal. These results survive our robustness checks. They suggest 
that, to some extent, the part-time pay advantage represents a compensation for the 
ineligibility of casual workers for holiday and sick pay. But that is not the only story, 
since part-time workers who are non-casual also enjoy a pay advantage. In the 
conclusion of the paper, we discuss some hypotheses that are consistent with these 
stylized facts.  
In the next section we briefly review hypotheses about part-time and full-time 
pay. Section 3 then outlines the econometric model, while Section 4 describes the data 
source and the raw data. The estimates are reported in Section 5, followed by the 
robustness checks. The final section concludes.  
2. BACKGROUND   
There are a number of hypotheses about the determinants of part-time/full-time wage 
differentials. Some suggest that part-time work should be associated with a penalty, 
while others suggest it might command a premium. Although all depend on the 
interaction of demand and supply factors, we group them below under the broad 
headings of demand-side factors, supply-side factors, and institutional aspects. 
Demand-side factors  
Fixed employment costs might mean firms prefer employees to work longer hours in 
order to recoup hiring and setup costs. According to this hypothesis, there should be a 
penalty to part-time work to enable firms to recover setup costs. However the “efficiency 
hours” hypothesis can predict the reverse. Suppose there is a hill-shaped relationship 
between hourly efficiency and the number of hours worked in a day or a week, as 
suggested by Booth and Ravallion (1993) in the debate on effects of hours cuts. To the 
extent that part-time workers are found on the rising part of the hill-shaped hourly 
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efficiency profile, their average productivity will be higher than that of individuals 
working sufficiently long hours that they are on the declining part of the efficiency hours 
profile. If this is the case, part-time work might be associated with a pay premium. 
An alternative hypothesis relates to firm’s production schedules. Some firms’ 
production technologies require part-time workers for demand peaks. For example, 
supermarkets and restaurants have variable demand, which might be best met by part-
time workers. If there is a fixed supply of such workers, any wage gap will reflect 
relative demand and supply factors.3  
Finally, firms might have more market power over part-time workers than full-
time workers. For example, part-timers might have childcare commitments constraining 
them to seek work close to home, and therefore reducing their outside options. This 
could give employers a greater degree of market power over part-time workers and result 
in a part-time pay penalty. 
Supply-side factors  
Part-time work might suit worker’s heterogeneous preferences, which can of course be 
affected by policies such as tax-benefit packages. Whether or not there are wage 
differentials depends on the supply of workers who prefer part-time work and the 
demand for them.4  
According to human capital theory, individuals who anticipate working part-time 
will invest less in education than those who intend to work full-time. In addition, part-
time workers accumulate experience capital at a lower rate than full-time workers, 
                                                          
3 Firms that are able to offer a range of part-time and full-time jobs might face better choice of workers. In 
countries where part-time work is preferred by many workers, firms could tinker the mix of jobs according 
to preferences of local labour supply. Firms in good position to offer part-time jobs might be in strong 
bargaining position to drive down part-time pay. Firms in poor positions might have to increase part-time 
pay. 
 
4 With only two exceptions - Australia and the US - mandatory job-protection and paid maternity leave 
provisions exist in all the countries reviewed by the OECD survey (OECD, 2001).  
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because they supply fewer hours. We should therefore observe in the raw data a part-
time pay penalty, as part-time workers are likely to have lower levels of both human and 
experience capital. However, any such penalty should be reduced once we control for 
education and experience in the multivariate estimation. 
Institutional Factors 
Effective marginal tax rates in Australia are high for relatively low-skilled second 
earners. Apps (2004) documents the very large effective marginal tax rates that operate 
with the removal of certain family benefits as the second earner moves into taxable 
market work.  As a consequence, firms requiring part-time workers – for example to 
meet demand peaks - may have to pay more to attract marginal workers into market-
sector employment. 
Australia is characterized by a unique award system of rates of pay (see Pocock, 
1995, for a summary of how this affected women in particular). Award provisions are 
largely designed to meet the needs of the industry concerned, as well as to protect future 
employment of both part-time and full-time employees (Hawke, 1993).  Although the 
Australian award system has been changing, part-time and full-time workers are not 
distinguished through the award system. However it is possible for individual 
agreements to allow particular workers to be paid above award agreements.  
The Australian casual pay premium is enshrined in awards, where casual workers are 
defined as those who are ineligible for sick and holiday pay entitlement (for an extensive 
discussion, see Wooden and Warren, 2003). However not all part-time workers are 
casual, as we shall see below.  
Finally, note that – unlike many US firms - Australian firms do not offer health 
insurance to their employees. However they are required to make compulsory 
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superannuation (pension) contributions for employees earning more than A$450 per 
month, and who are over 18 and under 70 years of age. 5   
 
3.  THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Our basic estimating equation, which incorporates the influences of various observed 
and unobserved characteristics on the log of hourly wages, is given by:  
 itiititit PXw εμαβ +++′=ln       (1)  
where i=1,…,N represents the number of individuals at each wave and t=1,…,4 is the 
number of waves. Note that Xit is a vector of characteristics that influence the outcome 
variable wit; the associated parameter vector is β; Pit denotes part-time employment 
status; μi is an unobserved individual-specific effect; and εit is a random error term. The 
parameter of interest is α . 
 Cross-sectional estimation of equation (1) is likely to produce biased estimates of 
α , since individuals are likely to self-select into full-time employment status based on 
unobservable factors. Suppose that μi denotes an individual’s ability in market 
production relative to home production and μi is fixed over time. Suppose further that 
this is negatively correlated with self-selection into part-time jobs and positively 
correlated with hourly wages. Then the estimated coefficient for part-time work in a 
cross-sectional regression will be negatively biased through the omission of any control 
for unobserved μ. However, once appropriate control has been taken of unobserved 
heterogeneity, we would expect that the part-time wage gap would become larger, 
                                                          
5 This compulsory Superannuation Guarantee Contribution Scheme was introduced by the Australian 
Government in 1992. It requires employers to pay 9% of an employees’ salary into a superannuation fund. 
Prior to 2002 the amount was 3%. See the Australian Tax Office (2005) for further details. Individuals can 
also choose to make extra voluntary contributions to their superannuation, for which they receive tax 
breaks.  In addition to this scheme, there is a means-tested state-funded old age pension provided by the 
Government. 
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ceteris paribus. Since failure to control appropriately for unobservables will result in 
omitted variable bias to the coefficient α , we utilise panel data techniques to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in estimating equation (1).6 We then compare these with the 
estimates obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) using pooled person-year 
observations. Our standard errors for the latter models are robust to heteroskedasticity, 
clustering by respondents’ cross-wave identifier.  
 
4. THE DATA, VARIABLES AND RAW PART-TIME WAGE GAP 
4.1 The Data  
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey is a 
nationally representative random-sample panel survey of private households in Australia. 
The first four waves span the period 2001-4.7 HILDA is particularly appropriate for 
studying part-time/full-time wage gaps, for several reasons. First, usual pay and hours 
information is given for the main job (facilitating classification into part-time based on 
hours in main job). Second, there is a very rich set of other controls potentially affecting 
wage determination, including casual and contract status. Clearly the richer the set of 
controls, the lower is unobserved heterogeneity.  
A further advantage to estimating the part-time/full-time wage gap using Australian 
rather than US data is that health insurance through the job is extremely rare in Australia, 
and thus the wage gap should not be influenced by differences in health insurance. 
However, as noted above, Australian employers are required to make compulsory 
                                                          
6  In preliminary analysis, we also estimated a sample selection model of participation and wages. Since 
the inverse Mills ratio in the wage equations was statistically significant, we do not report this in the 
results described in detail in Section 5 below. 
7  The survey is a longitudinal study of representative households in Australia. For details, see 
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda.  Wave 1 comprised 7682 households with 13,969 respondents 
aged 15 years and over.   
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superannuation (pension) contributions for employees earning more than A$450 per 
calendar month.8 The vast majority of our sample are covered by this. In one of our 
robustness checks reported in Section 5, we impute coverage using information on 
salaries, and include this additional variable in our preferred specification.  
Our analysis covers full-time and part-time employees aged between 18 and 60 
years in Wave 1, who are not in the armed forces, farming or fisheries, and with valid 
information on our main variables (hours of work, salary, and whether casual or 
permanent). We exclude the self-employed and owner-managers drawing a salary from 
their own businesses. Individuals reporting over 100 working hours per week (hours are 
used to derive hourly wages) were dropped, as were full-time students. Where there were 
many missing observations for control variables, we created dummy variables indicating 
their status, to maintain reasonable sample sizes. Our estimating subsample therefore 
represents an unbalanced panel of respondents who are present - and satisfy the selection 
criteria - in at least two adjacent waves. It comprises 2,386 women and 2,427 men, 
representing 7,774 person-year observations for women and 8,097 person-year 
observations for men. We estimate all our models separately for men and women, since 
initial testing indicated it was inappropriate to pool them. 
 
 4.2  The Variables    
The dependent variable in equation (1) is the hourly wage rate in the main job.  To 
calculate this, we used the HILDA derived variables for the current weekly gross wages 
and salary for the main job, and for hours worked per week in the main job during the 
                                                          
8 Employees who are covered by this may also choose to make contributions, typically deducted from 
gross pay at the job. The HILDA Survey does not indicate if individuals are covered by employer’s 
superannuation contributions, although the special wealth module in Wave 2 did include this question.  
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survey week. 9  We deflated wages to 2001 (wave 1) levels using the headline Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Respondents earning less 
than A$1 or more than A$100 in 2001 values were omitted from the analysis. No 
imputed data are released with the HILDA Survey and therefore none are used in the 
analysis (apart from the “no superannuation coverage” variable discussed at the end of 
Section 5). 
Our measure of part-time work is based on individuals’ usual hours of work in 
their main job (including any paid or unpaid overtime for work done at the workplace or 
at home). Part-time status is assigned to individuals reporting fewer than 35 hours per 
week.10  This is also the definition of part-time work used by Rodgers (2004). 
Following the procedure recommended by Wooden and Warren (2003), we adopt 
a measure of casual work based on self-assessment. The precise question eliciting this 
information is as follows: “Looking at (showcard), which of the following best describes 
your current contract of employment? Employed on a fixed term contract; employed on a 
casual basis; employed on a permanent or ongoing basis; other.” We used responses to 
this question to construct indicator variables, which we include as controls in our 
multivariate regression analysis, including a dummy variable for casual work. We also 
interact this casual status variable with part-time status.11  
Table A.1 in the Appendix gives the means of the main variables of interest, 
disaggregated by gender and by full-time or part-time employment status. Full-time 
women work on average 42 hours per week and earn an average hourly wage of 
                                                          
9 If the reported wages and salary for the main job in the survey week are not the usual wages and salary 
then the usual wages and salary were substituted in the derivation. Where the reported hours for the main 
job varied, the average hours worked per week were substituted. 
10 This differs from the Australian Bureau of Statistics measure, where part-time workers are defined as 
those who reported that they worked fewer than 35 hours per week in all of their jobs in the survey week. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics Labour Statistics:  Concepts, Sources and methods.  Catalogue number 
61020.55.001 Updated 28 July 2005. 
11 As discussed below, and shown in Table A.1, there is little difference across part-time and full-time 
workers in the extent of fixed term contracts, and so we do not interact this variable with part-time status 
in our multivariate analysis. Moreover, the cell sizes are relatively small for this variable. 
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A$17.66, while part-time women work 20.6 hours to earn A$16.74. This compares with 
full-time men who work 45.15 hours (earning A$19.89) and part-time men who work on 
average 20.80 hours (and earn A$16.78). A greater proportion of part-time workers of 
both sexes are casual (41% of women and 60% of men). Some 95% of full-time women 
and 94% of full-time men have only one job, as compared with 84% and 77% of part-
time women and men respectively. Fewer part-time workers of both sexes are on 
standard daytime schedules. Slightly more full-time workers are on fixed-term contracts, 
with 11.6% of full-time women and 8.5% of part-time women on fixed-term contracts, 
while 9% of full-time men and 7% of part-time men are on fixed-term contracts. 
There are also some interesting differences across demographic and educational 
variables. Proportionately more married and fewer cohabiting women work part-time 
while more married or cohabiting men work full-time. Full-time women and men are on 
average around 38 to 39 years old, while part-time women are 40 and part-time men 36. 
Experience and occupational tenure levels are fairly similar for full-time and part-time 
women, but part-time men are less experienced and have lower tenure levels (both in the 
occupation and in the firm) than full-time men who have the highest levels of these 
variables.12 Typically there are differences of between 2 to 3 years in mean employer 
and occupational tenures. Full-time and part-time women have very similar occupational 
tenure at nearly 9 years. For men there are relatively large differences between full-time 
and part-time employees for both tenure measures.13 Finally, note that full-time women 
                                                          
12 The experience variable is a derived history variable issued with the dataset.  The variable takes the data 
on years/months in paid employment at wave 1 or as collected from the new person questionnaire for a 
new survey entrant and the variable is updated with data suppled in the calendar section of the 
questionnaire for subsequent waves. The experience variable used is the HILDA derived variable for the 
actual time spent in paid work in years. For new persons, the value reported by the respondent is used.  For 
continuing persons, the time spent in paid work as recorded in the calendar is added to the value for the 
variable reported in the previous wave.  If the respondent was not interviewed in wave 2, then the calendar 
data is added to the value recorded for wave 1. 
13 Tenure with current employer variable (_JBEMPT in the questionnaire) was derived, by the Melbourne 
Institute, from the information supplied by the respondent at each wave. The derivation simply integrates 
the weeks and years into years with current employer.  Tenure in current occupation variable (_JBOCCT) 
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have higher educational levels than full-time men: 37% of full-time women and 26% of 
full-time men have at least a university degree and above. The proportions of part-time 
women and men with at least a university degree are around 26%.  
4.3. Transitions 
Next we turn to transitions across adjacent waves between our principal states of interest 
– into and out of part-time work and into and out of casual status - disaggregated by 
gender. Table 1(a) shows female transitions between these four states: part-time casual, 
part-time non-casual, full-time casual, and full-time non-casual. (As noted under the 
table, in the interests of parsimony other possible transitions are not shown.) The stayers 
are on the leading diagonal and all the movers are in the ‘off-diagonal’ cells. Thus we 
see, for example, that 125 women changed from part-time non-casual to part-time casual 
across waves, while 200 women changed from part-time casual to part-time non-casual.  
Of those 818 women who were part-time casual or non-casual in one wave, 367 were 
full-time casual or non-casual by the next wave. Figure 1(b) shows analogous transitions 
for men. Note that there are far fewer transitions between our states of interest for men 
than there are for women. 
Our initial fixed effects estimation (reported in Section 5.1) does not distinguish 
individuals moving into part-time status from individuals moving out of part-time status, 
in part because this reduces the number of cases making such a transition, as Table 1 
makes clear. However, in one of our subsequent robustness checks we do make this 
distinction, as will be seen in Section 5.2.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
was derived in the same way ie. the weeks and years that the respondent has worked in the current 
occupation is integrated into years. 
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4.4 The Distribution of Hours and Hourly Wages 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) give the distribution of usual weekly hours worked in the main job 
for women and men respectively (where observations are pooled across waves). For both 
men and women there is a spike at 40 hours per week, but female hours are also more 
dispersed across the lower part of the distribution. In addition, there are small spikes at 
five hourly intervals, as is usual in reported hours per week. 
Figure 2 shows mean hourly wages by hours worked across the distribution (from 
0 to 60 hours). Inspection of these figures reveals first, that there is considerable noise at 
hourly intervals not divisible by five (fewer workers are observed at these points) and 
also at the bottom of the hours distribution. Second, there is a relatively flat profile 
especially over the interval 5 to 50 hours for women and for men around 18 to 50. This 
is in contrast to results for the US found by Hirsch (2004), where hourly wages increased 
across the hours distribution and especially so for men. Third, there is a slight tendency 
for hourly wages to decline with hours worked for women and men supplying more than 
50 hours per week, perhaps reflecting the fact that some of these workers are not paid for 
overtime hours, as happens with some salaried workers. 
 
5. PART-TIME/FULL-TIME WAGE GAP ESTIMATES  
5.1 The OLS and FE Estimates  
We estimate equation (1) separately by gender. The results are reported in Table 2 for 
the five different specifications described in the notes under the table. For each 
specification we report the pooled estimates and the fixed effects (FE) estimates of 
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equation (1).14 The SEs for the pooled OLS estimates have been corrected for clustering. 
For readers interested in the impact of other variables, we report in Appendix Table A.2 
the full set of estimates from Specification [3].   
The first panel of Table 2 reports estimates for the main parameters of interest 
from Specification [1], which includes a constant, wave dummies, the part-time work 
variable, the casual work variable, and an interaction between the two. The interaction is 
included because it is often argued that part-time workers are predominantly casual 
workers and perhaps this is why they are paid more. However, while it is sometimes 
argued that the majority of part-timers are casual, our data show this is the case only for 
men. Casual women are in the minority amongst part-time women, as the means reported 
in Appendix Table A.1 indicate.15
The pooled OLS estimates in Specification [1] show that wages are around 1% 
lower for part-time women who are not casual workers, although this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The base is full-time non-casual women. But once part-time 
women’s casual status is taken into account, their wages are nearly 9% higher (ie -0.012 
+ 0.098 = 0.086) than full-time women. Full-time workers who are casual earn around 
23% lower wages than full-time women who are non-casual. A similar result is found for 
men.  But the FE estimates of Specification [1] tell a different story. There is now a 
statistically significant part-time pay advantage for both women and men. Only for parti-
time men does casual status diminish the pay advantage. The interaction coefficient is -
0.078 for men, but is positive for women, though statistically insignificant. 
Next consider Specification [2], containing all the additional individual 
characteristics as detailed in the notes under Table 2. As shown in the second panel of 
                                                          
14 FE is consistent when μi  and the xijt are correlated. In preliminary analysis we also estimated random 
effects models. However since the  FE estimates were preferred across all specifications, we report only 
these and the pooled OLS estimates in the interests of space.  
15  
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Table 2, the FE estimates of the part-time coefficient are again positive and statistically 
significant, and represent a pay advantage of about 9% for women and 14% for men.16 
The interaction variable PT*Casual is also statistically significant for both women and 
men, albeit only at the 10% level. Non-casual women in part-time work enjoy a pay 
advantage over full-time non-casual women of just over 9%. But if such women are 
casual as well as part-time, their pay advantage increases to nearly 15%. Non-casual 
part-time men enjoy a larger pay advantage, of about 14%, over full-time men. However, 
if men are both part-time and casual, their pay advantage relative to full-time permanent 
workers falls to around 9%. Notice that the estimated coefficient to casual status on its 
own is not statistically significant across all FE specifications. Casual status does not 
significantly affect the wages of full-time male and female employees. It is only through 
its interaction with part-time status that it has an effect. 
Specification [3] adds in additional controls for education, employer tenure and 
experience, our three measures of human capital. We know from the means in Table A1 
that PT workers are on average less educated, have lower tenure with the current 
employer, and are less experienced than full-time workers. As expected, once these 
variables are included, the part-time pay advantage increases further, albeit only by a 
small amount. We also re-estimated Specifications [3] to [5] using occupational tenure in 
place of employer tenure. This made no difference to the FE estimates, but it did result in 
very small changes to the pooled OLS estimates.17  
                                                          
16  The FE estimates are identified from individuals changing their employment status between waves, and 
the number of changers for each sex are reported in Table 1. It is interesting that the majority of the 
changers for whom we have information about the employer stayed with the same employer. Note 
however that not all changers were asked the question eliciting this information. 
17  Controlling for occupational rather than employer  tenure in  Specification [3], our  pooled OLS 
estimates for women were -0.011 (0.87) for the part-time coefficient, -0.147 (5.14) for the casual  
coefficient and 0.104 (3.24) for  PT*casual. For men, the pooled OLS estimates were -0.062 (1.82) for the 
part-time coefficient, -0.069 (3.26) for the casual  coefficient and 0.070 (1.57) for  PT*casual. The FE 
estimates were virtually identical to those reported in Table 2 regardless of the tenure measure used. 
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Each of the additional specifications in Table 2 incrementally adds in blocks of 
explanatory variables, in the order given in the notes under the table. We included 
occupational status dummy variables only in the last specification, Specification [5], 
since occupation is potentially endogenous. Note that our estimated parameters of 
interest do not alter with the inclusion of this set of occupational dummies. Controlling 
for occupational change, there is still a large part-time pay advantage. It is interesting to 
see that the OLS estimates for part-time women across Specifications [3] to [5] are 
positive, although statistical significant only for Specifications [4] and [5]. Moreover, the 
OLS estimates show that, once the interaction is taken into account, PT casuals enjoy a 
larger pay advantage. 
To summarise, the FE estimates show that part-time non-casual women – once 
other observable and unobservable characteristics have been taken into account  -  earn a 
pay premium of around 10 log points over and above comparable full-time colleagues. 
But if they are casual as well as part-time, their pay advantage increases to around 14-15 
log points. However, the majority of part-time women are non-casual. In contrast, part-
time non-casual men enjoy a pay advantage over full-time comparable men of around 
15% but this drops to around 10% if they are casual as well as part-time. And the 
majority of part-time men are casual.  
These findings suggest that there is self-selection into part-time work. We 
controlled for this by differencing out time-invariant unobservables that could otherwise 
lead to negatively biased coefficients to our variables of interest, part-time and casual 
status. This negative selection is consistent with the results of Hirsch (2005) and Rodgers 
(2004).  
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5.2 Robustness Checks  
In this subsection we undertake a number of robustness checks. First, we investigate 
whether or not our results sensitive to the 35 hour cut point defining part-time work. 
Second, Figure 2 showed that there was considerable noise in the data at low hours, and 
we investigate if our results are sensitive to exclusion of those observations at very low 
hours. Third, our FE estimates so far have treated changes into part-time status the same 
as changes out of part-time status, and casual status has been similarly treated. We 
therefore experiment with relaxing this assumption and treating changes into these 
employment types separately from changes out of these states.  Finally, we investigate 
whether or not those few workers whose employers do not make superannuation 
contributions on their behalf are paid a wage differential to compensate for their lack of 
superannuation accumulation. 
Table 3 displays the results of these different robustness checks. To save space, 
we report only the estimated coefficients for the parameters of interest from 
Specification [3]. Recall that our definition of part-time work was based on usual hours 
of work in the main job being less than 35 hours. But individuals in the neighbourhood 
of this margin might have been erroneously classified as part-time when they were 
actually full-time, or vice versa. To take this possibility into account, in our first 
robustness check we dropped all cases whose reported usual hours of work in their main 
job lay in a band of 6 hours around 35 hours. Thus we dropped men and women whose 
usual hours lay between 32 and 37 hours inclusive. The pooled OLS and FE estimates 
from this exercise are reported in the first panel of Table 3. The FE estimates are now 
larger compared to Specification [3] in Table 2 and remain statistically significant. 
As our second robustness check, we restored those observations described above 
and instead dropped from our estimating sub-sample all individuals whose usual hours 
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were less than five.  We did this to eliminate from the sub-sample the noisy observations 
illustrated in Figure 2. In the second panel of Table 3, we report our estimates obtained 
from this sub-sample. Again we find that the estimates are very similar to those for 
Specification [3] in Table 2. We next repeated this procedure on a further-reduced sub-
sample in which we dropped all individuals whose usual hours were less than ten. These 
estimates are reported in Panel 3 of Table 3. The FE estimates are slightly smaller than 
before, although still large and statistically significant. However for women the part-
time*casual effect is only statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.  
As our next robustness check, we distinguished between individuals moving into 
and out of part-time status, and into and out of casual status. The fourth panel of Table 3 
displays the results from this estimation. There were very small numbers of cases 
making some of these transitions, as indicated in the transition matrix of Table 1. For 
this reason, we would not wish to place too much emphasis on these results. 
Nonetheless, they do show that moving into part-time work is, ceteris paribus, 
associated with a pay gain, while moving out is associated with a pay loss. This is found 
for both the OLS and FE estimates, although not all are statistically significant. Consider 
women for example. The FE estimates indicate that shifting from full-time to part-time 
work is associated with a 9% gain, while the reverse transition involves a 7% wage loss. 
A shift into part-time and casual generates an extra 8% gain. 
Finally, we investigated whether or not those workers whose employers do not 
make superannuation contributions on their behalf are paid a compensating wage 
differential. Using information from the Australian Tax Office about allowable 
exclusions from the compulsory Superannuation Guarantee Contribution Scheme 
(SGCS), 18  we constructed a dummy variable “no super” taking the value 1 if an 
                                                          
18 HILDA does not provide this information, apart from in Wave 2, so we had to impute it from earnings 
per calendar month in the main job. There are two instances where the employer of a person working less 
 16
individual earned less than $450 per calendar month in his or her main job and zero 
otherwise. The number of cases in this “no super” category was extremely small, being 
4.01% of female person-year observations and just 0.90% of male.  
The results of re-estimation of Specification [3] including this variable are 
reported in the last panel of Table 3. Ceteris paribus, workers who are not eligible for 
coverage by the provisions of the SGCS have hourly wages that are significantly lower 
than those who are eligible. These results suggest that there is no compensating 
differential for the lack of mandatory employer pension contributions for uncovered 
workers. Perhaps this is unsurprising, since “no super” is also an indicator for being 
towards the bottom of the earnings distribution, where workers are unlikely to have any 
market power and by construction workers in the “no super” group are on average low 
paid. Nonetheless we reported these results for completeness. The estimated coefficients 
for part-time work and its interaction with casual status are similar to those reported in 
Table 2 for Specification [3], although for women part-time status alone has a smaller 
impact while the interaction has a larger impact. Both coefficients are statistically 
significant. For men, part-time status alone has a smaller impact. Its interaction with 
casual also has a smaller impact and the latter is not statistically significant. Nonetheless 
there remains a clear pay advantage to part-time work for Australian women and men. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
than 30 hours per week and earning more than $450 in a calendar month is not required to contribute to the 
Superannuation Guarantee Scheme: (a) if the person is less than 18 years of age; (b) if the person is 
employed for domestic or private work. The first case is not a problem for us following our age sample 
selection criteria.  The second case is a problem as we cannot identify these people easily in our 
sample. They will include domestic cleaners/housekeepers and education professionals such as private art 
or music teachers and others.  To identify them we need an occupational code at the 4-digit level and we 
only have the 2-digit code. We have 3 respondents who are employed by private households, 2 of whom 
work 15 hours per week but earn more than $450 per month. We incorporate these in our “no_super” 
measure. Finally, note that the $450 per calendar month in main job must be based on ordinary time 
earnings so that no overtime is included.  However the HILDA respondents are asked to state their usual 
hours of work including overtime.  We may therefore have some respondents in the file who have given 
wages/salary figures that include overtime payments. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
Our empirical analysis revealed that, once unobserved individual heterogeneity is taken 
into account, part-time men and women in Australia typically earn an hourly pay 
premium. This premium varies with casual employment status. Thus part-time women 
who are on casual contracts earn more than part-time non-casual women, who in turn 
earn more than the full-time women ceteris paribus. However part-time men who are 
casuals earn less than part-time non-casual men, although they still earn more than full-
time men. These results suggest that, to some extent, the part-time pay advantage 
represents a compensation for the ineligibility of casual workers for holiday and sick pay. 
But that is not the only story, since part-time workers who are non-casual also enjoy a 
pay advantage. Moreover our robustness checks indicated these findings are quite stable. 
Our penultimate robustness check – distinguishing between changes into and out of part-
time status and casual status – suggested the wage advantage from shifting into part-time 
work was slightly larger in absolute terms than the wage penalty from shifting out of 
part-time work, although the difference was very small. 
What hypotheses are consistent with these stylized facts? Our discussion can only 
speculative, since we are unable to distinguish empirically between hypotheses with our 
data. In the Australian context, the only way part-time workers can earn more is through 
individual agreements paid above awards agreements, or because part-time workers are 
less likely to work extra hours, which has the effect of bringing down measured hourly 
wages for FT workers.19
Our interaction results (in which part-time status was interacted with casual status), 
suggest that the part-time pay advantage is to some degree a compensating wage 
differential for the lack of holiday and sick pay entitlement experienced by most casual 
                                                          
19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making these two points. 
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workers. But nonetheless, even part-time non-casual workers enjoy a part-time pay 
advantage. Why might firms be willing to pay non-casual part-time workers more than 
their full-time counterparts? One candidate explanation is high effective marginal tax 
rates drive up part-time wages. The part-time pay premium could reflect the high 
effective marginal tax rates faced by relatively low-skilled second earners in Australia 
(Apps, 2004). As a consequence, firms with strong demand for part-time workers may 
have to pay more to attract these workers.  
Another candidate explanation is that part-time workers are more productive for the 
time that they are at work. According to the efficiency hours hypothesis, part-time 
workers may be more productive because they are more focused on their jobs for a 
shorter time period each day and therefore are on the rising part of the hours-productivity 
hill. For this reason firms might be willing to pay part-time workers a pay premium. 
Booth and Van Ours (2005), also using the HILDA dataset, found that partnered 
women’s life satisfaction is higher if they work part-time. It is conceivable – although 
impossible to test with these data - that this greater life satisfaction might spill over into 
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Table 1(a): Transition Matrix Showing Changes in Part-time and Casual 




































































Notes: (i) Data from waves 1 to 4 of the HILDA Survey for employees with data for 
all waves or at least two consecutive waves. (ii) Other transitions (for example from 
part-time casual or non-casual to part-time fixed term contract or to part-time in the 






Table 1(b): Transition Matrix Showing Changes in in Part-time and 





































































Notes: (i) Data from waves 1 to 4 of the HILDA Survey for employees with data for 
all waves or at least two consecutive waves. (ii) Other transitions (for example from 
part-time casual or non-casual to part-time fixed term contract or to part-time in the 









Table 2: Estimates of Part-time/Full-time Log Wage Differential  
  WOMEN  MEN  
Specification Variables Pooled FE Pooled FE 
[1] Part-time -0.012 0.098 -0.129 0.147 
  (0.82) (7.67) (3.35) (6.99) 
 Casual -0.229 -0.006 -0.213 0.170 
  (8.05) (0.29) (10.86) (1.06) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.098 0.035 0.125 -0.078 
  (2.95) (1.45) (2.59) (2.82) 
      
[2] Part-time -0.036 0.096 -0.073 0.139 
  (2.54) (7.46) (1.96) (6.60) 
 Casual -0.222 -0.023 -0.128 0.002 
  (7.38) (1.02) (5.92) (0.15) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.130 0.047 0.106 -0.052 
  (3.79) (1.88) (2.23) (1.89) 
      
[3] Part-time -0.002 0.101 -0.062 0.156 
  (0.18) (7.85) (1.85) (7.41) 
 Casual -0.132 -0.020 -0.053 0.010 
  (4.52) (0.89) (2.41) (0.60) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.095 0.055 0.059 -0.056 
  (2.94) (2.22) (1.34) (2.03) 
      
[4] Part-time 0.156 0.103 0.000 0.156 
  (1.32) (7.98) (0.00) (7.41) 
 Casual -0.085 -0.015 0.013 0.007 
  (2.86) (0.68) (0.62) (0.44) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.092 0.053 0.050 -0.051 
  (2.83) (2.15) (1.16) (1.86) 
      
[5] Part-time 0.051 0.107 0.053 0.159 
  (4.55) (8.20) (1.67) (7.58) 
 Casual -0.042 -0.014 0.043 0.008 
  (1.52) (0.64) (2.13) (0.51) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.060 0.054 0.008 -0.052 
  (1.98) (2.17) (0.19) (1.91) 
      








Notes:  robust t-statistics (corrected for clustering) in parentheses. The number of observations reported for the FE 
models are the numbers changing part-time status between waves. 
(i) Specification [1] contains a constant, part-time and casual employment status dummies, and three wave dummies.  
(ii) Specification [2] also contains personal characteristics (onejob, daywork, contract, tempagency, state/territory 
dummies (7), marital status (3), Australian-born, born in English speaking country, urban dummies, and seven age 
dummies (age2529 age3034 age3539 age4044 age4549 age5054 age55plus). The base is full-time workers <25 years, 
in shift work on a permanent contract, not a casual worker, in NSW in a remote area, single, and born in nes country. 
(iii) Specification [3] is as for [2] plus tenure, tensq, experience, expersq, and educational dummies (the base is “year 
11 and below”).  
(iv) Specification [4] adds in firm attributes and industry dummies (union member, establishment size, public sector, 
one-digit industry dummies).  The base is someone who is not a union member, who works in a very small private 
sector establishment (fewer than 20 employees) in “other services” industry. 
(v) Specification [5] adds in occupational dummies with the base being “elementary clerical”. 
(vi) The full set of estimates from Specification [3] are reported in Appendix Table A.2. 





 Table 3: Robustness Checks of Part-time/Full-time Log Wage Differential  
Based on Specification [3] - NEW 
 
  WOMEN  MEN  
Robustness Check Variables Pooled FE Pooled FE 
      
[1] Omit PT/FT Part-time 0.014 0.156 -0.051 0.178 
Borderline cases  (0.97) (9.11) (1.35) (6.59) 
(hrs≥32 and hrs≤37) Casual -0.147 -0.034 -0.042 0.004 
  (4.10) (1.14) (1.71) (0.22) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.113 0.056 0.051 -0.077 
  (2.87) (1.81) (1.02) (2.33) 
      
 No. of obs. 6286 2016 7174 2206 
      
[2]  Omit cases <5hrs Part-time -0.005 0.099 -0.059 0.157 
  (0.35) (7.80) (1.75) (7.46) 
 Casual -0.134 -0.021 -0.054 0.010 
  (4.63) (0.96) (2.49) (0.60) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.090 0.052 0.047 -0.059 
  (2.78) (2.13) (1.06) (2.13) 
      
 No. of obs. 7653 2352 8059 2416 
      
[3] Omit cases <10hrs Part-time -0.005 0.092 -0.064 0.143 
  (0.39) (7.51) (1.84) (6.70) 
 Casual -0.136 -0.019 -0.052 0.004 
  (4.75) (0.89) (2.39) (0.24) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.089 0.042 0.039 -0.058 
  (2.75) (1.80) (0.89) (2.04) 
      
 No. of obs. 7210 2228 7936 2385 
      
[4] Asymmetries Into part-time 0.064 0.086 0.047 0.083 
  (2.95) (4.77) (0.84) (2.93) 
 Out of part-time -0.83 -0.071 -0.104 -0.041 
  (3.96) (3.95) (3.22) (1.56) 
 Into casual -0.020 -0.013 -0.006 0.012 
  (0.68) (0.61) (0.19) (0.51) 
 Out of casual -0.046 0.004 -0.058 0.009 
  (1.65) (0.25) (2.23) (0.48) 
 Into PT*Incasual 0.011 0.084 -0.077 0.002 
  (0.15) (1.92) (0.77) (0.05) 
 Out PT*Incasual 0.010 0.016 -0.086 -0.405 
  (0.11) (0.19) (0.52) (4.70) 
 In PT*Outcasual 0.025 -0.035 0.013 0.011 
  (0.30) (0.43) (0.14) (0.10) 
 In PT*Outcasual -0.009 -0.039 -0.017 -0.074 
  (0.20) (1.07) (0.31) (1.73) 
      
 No. of observations 7772 2386 8097 2427 






Table 3 (Continued): Based on Specification [3]  
 
  WOMEN  MEN  
Robustness Check Variables Pooled FE Pooled FE 
      
[5] Addition of  Part-time 0.008 0.106 -0.041 0.157 
“No superannuation”  (0.64) (8.34) (1.22) (7.51) 
variable Casual -0.134 -0.020 -0.051 0.012 
  (4.73) (0.92) (2.38) (0.71) 
 Part-time*Casual 0.146 0.070 0.114 -0.034 
  (4.46) (2.90) (2.59) (1.23) 
 No superannuation -0.386 -0.295 -0.720 -0.406 
  (7.38) (12.97) (5.3) (10.59) 
      
 Observations 7,774 2,386 8,097 2,427 
      
See notes under Table 2 for list of additional variables included in Specification [3]. Pooled OLS standard 







Appendix Table A.1: Means for Full-time and Part-time (Main Job)  
Men and Women for Selected Variables 
 Women Men 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Work Attributes     
Log hourly earnings 2.871 2.818 2.990 2.820 
Usual hours per week in main job 41.970 20.561 45.154 20.798 
Casual 0.057 0.409 0.063 0.603 
Part-time/casual interaction 0 0.409 0 0.603 
Into part-time/into casual interaction 0 0.019 0 0.057 
Out of part-time/into casual interaction 0.003 0 0.389 0 
Into part-time/out of casual interaction 0 0.003 0 0.007 
Out of part-time/out of casual interaction 0.025 0 0.108 0 
Fixed term contract 0.116 0.085 0.091 0.071 
Employed through a labour hire firm 0.024 0.034 0.030 0.049 
One job only 0.948 0.841 0.942 0.769 
Regular daytime schedule (main job) 0.833 0.684 0.784 0.552 
Tenure with current employer (years) 6.839 5.429 7.760 3.619 
Tenure in current occupation (years) 8.720 8.809 10.194 5.718 
Trade union member 0.371 0.282 0.369 0.236 
Public sector  0.193 0.155 0.122 0.100 
     
Demographics     
Age 38.509 39.883 38.898 36.464 
Experience 17.985 17.517 20.776 16.698 
Married 0.458 0.599 0.599 0.390 
Cohabiting 0.165 0.108 0.138 0.122 
Urban 0.686 0.612 0.669 0.642 
Inner regional 0.205 0.267 0.227 0.252 
Outer regional (base is remote/very remote) 0.086 0.101 0.083 0.086 
Australian born 0.783 0.805 0.775 0.762 
Born in English speaking country 0.099 0.089 0.112 0.078 
     
Education dummy variables:     
Postgraduate degree (masters or doctorate) 0.047 0.024 0.048 0.041 
Grad diploma, grad certificate 0.101 0.074 0.054 0.060 
Bachelor degree 0.220 0.161 0.162 0.165 
Advanced diploma, diploma 0.122 0.090 0.083 0.088 
Certificate iii or iv 0.123 0.139 0.305 0.143 
Certificate i or ii and certificate not defined 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.010 
Year 12 0.160 0.181 0.128 0.281 
Year 11 and below 0.219 0.316 0.215 0.213 
     
Number of person-year observations 4197 3577 7274 823 








Appendix Table A.2 Full Estimates of Specification [3]  
 WOMEN MEN 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Part-time -0.002 0.18 0.101 7.85 -0.062 1.85 0.156 7.41 
Casual -0.132 4.52 -0.020 0.89 -0.053 2.41 0.010 0.60 
PT* casual 0.095 2.94 0.055 2.22 0.059 1.34 -0.056 2.03 
Onejob -0.045 2.66 -0.011 0.83 -0.013 0.59 -0.046 3.01 
Daywork -0.033 2.59 -0.006 0.51 -0.057 3.42 0.026 2.33 
Fixd contract -0.019 1.27 -0.009 0.70 0.051 2.34 0.002 0.14 
tempagency 0.054 1.41 0.063 2.74 0.071 2.21 0.078 3.78 
Vic -0.091 5.72 0.022 0.39 -0.046 2.4 0.099 1.86 
Qld -0.091 5.90 0.010 0.16 -0.075 3.82 -0.155 3.38 
Sa -0.125 4.90 0.076 0.74 -0.164 5.80 0.102 0.92 
Wa -0.078 3.60 -0.067 0.80 -0.070 2.73 0.111 1.66 
Tas -0.088 2.94 -0.007 0.07 -0.100 2.53 -0.351 2.81 
Nt -0.011 0.15 0.295 2.24 -0.107 1.03 0.062 0.58 
Act 0.068 1.97 0.149 1.33 0.071 1.46 0.068 0.89 
Marr 0.040 1.87 0.020 0.69 0.138 6.36 0.088 3.35 
Cohab 0.033 1.66 0.013 0.57 0.099 4.45 0.058 2.82 
Wds 0.032 1.27 0.002 0.05 0.072 2.09 0.087 2.71 
born_oz 0.016 0.77 (dropped)  0.052 2.30 (dropped)  
born_engsp 0.067 2.51 (dropped)  0.120 3.72 (dropped)  
Urban -0.010 0.33 -0.008 0.18 -0.049 1.18 -0.039 0.98 
Innreg -0.050 1.64 -0.008 0.19 -0.146 3.48 -0.034 0.88 
Outreg -0.073 2.26 -0.027 0.62 -0.140 3.13 0.003 0.08 
Age25-29 0.064 2.79 -0.030 1.09  0.075 2.76 -0.018 0.70 
Age30-34 0.069 2.43 -0.055 1.40 0.083 2.25 -0.024 0.72 
Age35-39 0.026 0.75 -0.085 1.79 0.057 1.24 -0.062 1.50 
Age40-44 0.020 0.56 -0.109 2.03 0.067 1.25 -0.059 1.24 
Age45-49 -0.015 0.38 -0.096 1.61 -0.026 0.42 -0.063 1.18 
Age50-54 -0.033 0.72 -0.120 1.84 0.017 0.23 -0.064 1.09 
Age55+ -0.041 0.89 -0.104 1.41 -0.036 0.41 -0.065 0.99 
Tenure 0.014 6.06 -0.003 1.28 0.008 3.11 0.001 0.34 
Tensq -0.0003 3.13 -0.0001 1.40 -0.00003 0.35 0.00004 0.51 
Exper 0.017 5.17 0.018 0.65 0.015 3.21 0.054 1.99 
Expersq -0.0003 4.41 -0.001 5.23 -0.0002 2.02 -0.001 6.45 
Postgrad 0.369 10.03 0.116 1.39 0.389 10.12 -0.010 0.12 
Graddip 0.334 15.54 0.0 0.00 0.327 10.60 0.005 0.07 
Bachelor 0.284 17.12 0.006 0.011 0.296 11.98 0.078 1.37 
cert3or4 0.007 0.42 -0.033 0.82 0.034 2.07 -0.013 0.30 
cert12nd -0.065 1.89 -0.003 0.03 -0.366 2.29 0.353 2.21 
year12 0.050 2.78 -0.115 2.27 0.032 1.31 -0.145 3.00 
wave2 0.012 1.50 0.037 1.34 0.011 1.40 0.009 0.32 
Wave3 0.026 3.13 0.079 1.49 0.023 2.72 0.015 0.29 
Wave4 0.047 4.87 0.121 1.55 0.053 5.69 0.032 0.41 
_cons 2.583 57.09 2.845 6.52 2.611 44.46 2.302 4.55 
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